The Global Interagency Security Forum , GISF, a member-led NGO forum that drives change through a global network of over 130 member organisations, presented a report on Partnerships and Security Risk Management from the local partner’s perspective, in September 2020.
Extract from GISF Report on Partnership in Security Risk Management (link of the document here) :
“The role of local and national non-governmental organisations (L/NNGOs) in the delivery of
humanitarian and development services, as well as in other sectors such as human rights defence,
continues to gain in prominence – and is increasingly recognised. Many do so with the financial and technical support of international NGOs (INGOs).
The ‘localisation’ of aid for sustainability and effectiveness, as well as greater insecurity and
limited access, is contributing to a greater reliance of INGOs on local partners to implement aid
programmes globally. These partnerships result in processes of mutual risk transfer between L/NNGOs and international NGOs (INGOs) but haven’t always translated into better security risk management (SRM) for local actors. Despite their central, frontline role in bringing relief to communities, until now the views of L/NNGOs on the security threats they face, the way they manage them and their partnerships, haven’t been researched in depth.
Aiming to improve the understanding of, and collaboration on, SRM between partners, this
research paper seeks to:
- Provide insight into L/NNGOs’ security risk management culture, perceptions, capacities,
practices, needs and expectations in their partnership with INGOs; - Establish a platform for L/NNGOs to share their views and enhance dialogue between
international and local/national NGOs; - Identify opportunities to improve the effectiveness of support in partnerships and
better mutual understanding.
The report is mainly targeted at staff that have partner management and relationship responsibilities including security advisors, human resources staff and senior management, as well as general project/programme managers within international, national and local humanitarian and development organisations.
Through a literature review, a global survey with over 200 respondents, more than 70 interviews
with representatives of L/NNGOs, and four case studies (in Colombia, Ethiopia, Myanmar and Syria), the research found that, regardless of the level of risk in an environment, security doesn’t feature prominently in partnership discussions or budgets.
The perspectives of those interviewed for this study have already been a wake-up call for their
international partners and for themselves. The majority of L/NNGOs surveyed mentioned a widespread absence of conversations, of dedicated budget lines for security, and of basic security requirements within partnership agreements. Discussions about risk often seem to focus on international partners’ priorities, centring around fiduciary or legal risks. The failure to prioritise security within partnerships justifies the impression amongst staff of L/NNGOs that INGO partners are simply not concerned about the security risks L/NNGOs face. While this is not always the case, and various examples of good practice exist, most interviewees felt on their own when it came to dealing with security.
Various barriers to the adequate discussion and support of security risk management in partnerships were identified. Financial disincentives (such as the fear of losing funding, competition between L/NNGOs, budget rigidities and pressure to reduce overheads) deter L/NNGOs from voicing security challenges and requesting additional support.
- This absence of transparency reinforces existing misunderstandings around the security risks that L/NNGOs face (e.g. assumptions that they face lesser levels of risks or misunderstandings of the context). Misconceptions arise from the lack of joint risk and context analysis, lack of regular and adequate communication, but also language barriers. The dominance of short-term, project-based partnerships further prevent strategic and sustainable support to L/NNGOs’ SRM capacity.
- Their reduced timeframe and scope of engagement are not conducive to building relationships of trust between partners and impede mutual understanding. This also explains why L/NNGOs, in some cases, receive support or security training that doesn’t match their needs. In contrast, L/NNGOs expressed their appreciation of INGO partners that commit to the long-term, engage with the context, are flexible with budget and support, and invest in building human rapport.
- Improving partnerships requires better understanding of L/NNGOs’ security risks and their
approach to managing them. Due to their proximity to the context, L/NNGOs are generally more exposed to security risks than INGOs. Besides physical frontline threats, they are more vulnerable to threats stemming from authorities, national legislations and local communities. As both nationals and aid workers, L/NNGO staff often suffer from the overlap of security risks between their personal and professional lives (e.g. security risks may persist for a long time, even affecting staff’s family members). - Their proximity to the operating context influences L/NNGOs’ approach to security risks. Their staff will experience varying degrees of risk ownership and risk habituation. A sense of responsibility towards fellow citizens and familiarity with risks may push them to take on more risk to deliver relief. Practices of SRM differ according to the nature of the L/NNGO – with the largest faring better and having, in some instances, well-developed systems and protocols. Among smaller organisations, researchers observed an absence of systematic approaches to SRM – at least in the way it is done by INGOs. Whilst expressing a desire for their skills to be recognised, L/NNGOs also voiced many support needs (including establishing a security culture, developing protocols, receiving security training, equipment, insurance and seeing their international partners publicly condemning the threats they face)
- L/NNGOs do feel INGO partners have a certain responsibility to support them in managing
the security risks associated with partnering on aid operations. Whilst ‘risk transfer’ is the
most adequate term to describe processes at play in current partnerships, it needs to be
reconceptualised. Besides being transferred, risks are also created and transformed in partnerships. They shift not only from INGOs to L/NNGOs but also from the local to the global level and involve additional actors such as donors and communities. Security risk transfer may be intentional or unintentional and is perceived differently depending on the partners. - This research paper suggests the following definition of risk transfer: the formation or transformation of risks (increasing or decreasing) for one actor caused by the presence or action of another, whether intentionally or unintentionally. Some L/NNGOs see risk transfer as occurring when they are asked to take on further tasks by their partners but don’t receive proportionate funding to manage the additional risks. Whilst ‘risk-sharing’remains an aspiration, there are various practical ways to ensure that responsibility for risks is more equitably shared between partners. Acknowledging the impact of existing power imbalances, including local partners on an equal footing when discussing and acting on security risks, committing resources and favouring sustainable engagement are among the changes necessary to improve the handling of security risks in partnerships. Supporting platforms
and strengthening mechanisms that facilitate collaboration between NGOs at all levels also
emerged as a desirable outcome.
Through this paper, GISF hopes to start an open conversation on managing security risks in
partnerships and pave the way towards better collaboration.”